By Ali Ibrahim: "Water Wars Future Fact Unless Regional Agreements Are Reached", [London, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in Arabic, 16 Oct 91, p.6].
(Ali Ibrahim writes about the Middle East's water problem, its relation to ongoing arrangements for peace talks in relation to ongoing arrangements for peace talks in the region, and the postponement of the 22-country conference that was scheduled to be held in Turkey on the future of water in the Middle East. He monitors several aspects of a problem that poses a future threat to the peoples of the region.)
Water wars in the Middle East are a future fact that international research centers and strategy experts predict, as long as the tension that has begun to rise among the region's countries over this important resource is not alleviated now through regional cooperation for joint exploitation of available common water resources.
The postponement of the Turkish-sponsored regional conference on water in the Middle East that was scheduled to be held next month reflects the extent to which this vital issue is linked to political arrangements and conditions in the region. The explanation offered for the postponement was the desire not to create interference with American efforts to hold a Middle East peace conference at the end of the month. The behind-the-scenes explanation was that Syria had refused to participate in the conference if Israel participated. American press reports said that Syria was refusing to promise to enter the third phase of the regional peace talks, involving regional arrangements about water, unless Israel promised to withdraw from the Golan Heights.
Even before the postponement, much controversy accompanied reports of preparations for the conference in Turkey, amid uncertainty about the topics that would be raised for discussion. The single clear topic was a Turkish-supported scheme for which economic feasibility studies have been prepared. It has been nicknamed "Pipes for Peace"--a clear sign of the connection between the water problem and political arrangements in the Middle East.
The project calls for laying pipelines costing between $20 billion and $30 billion to deliver surplus water from the rivers of Turkey to the Arab countries, especially the Gulf states, across Syria and Jordan. Turkey has promoted the idea for years and has proposed it to the Gulf states. However, the high cost and political perils of relying on a water source not controlled by the receiving countries, plus the problem of Israel's presence in the heart of the region adjoining the pipeline, have thus far made implementation of the idea impractical.
Reports have leaked out about a scheme that Israel proposed to the European Community to solve the Middle East's water problem in the context of comprehensive arrangements in the postpeace phase. It involves using surplus water from the Litani River and the water of the Yarmuk River, in addition to diverting 1 percent of the Nile's water to the Gaza Strip and the Negev after implementing joint projects to increase the flow of Nile water to Egypt by 25 percent. This would be done by draining marshes to reduce evaporation. This is a revival of an old idea that was raised during the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks and that met with opposition from Cairo. It is not expected to gain acceptance, especially since Egypt itself faces a future threat of inadequate water coming from the heart of Africa up the Nile.
Amid the political disagreements and divergent interests, a basic fact stands out: The peoples of the region are threatened with a severe water crisis in the future, one that could lead to wars between rival parties sharing the limited resources. Egypt's defense minister bluntly hinted several weeks ago that his country was prepared to use military deterrence if it felt that its flow of Nile water was threatened.
The Middle East's water problem is divided into a number of fronts, or axes. The most critical of them is the one on which Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria mesh with Israel, especially because the water problem has begun to be severe in the West Bank, Jordan, and Israel. Next, water is tied to Turkey, which controls the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Then, there is the problem of Egypt's increasing water needs and talk about proposed dams in certain African countries, particularly Ethiopia, that share in the Nile. On the periphery, there are the increasing water needs in the Gulf, although these do not represent an immediate problem because of desalination plant projects. Finally, there is Libya's man-made river project, with conflicting reports emerging about its effect on ground water in Egypt and Sudan.
Despite the importance of the problem, there are still no internationally-recognized regional agreements between all parties, or even serious negotiations. One exception is Egypt's effort to sign an agreement among the eight countries that share the Nile River despite the reservations of a crucial party, Ethiopia.
The region's most explosive water problem is the one at whose heart Israel stands with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, particularly since the state of war officially continues and no agreements exist. Still clearly remembered are Israel's operations to seize Arab water resources by a logic of force and to divert the Jordan River, this elicited the holding of the first Arab summit.
Israel, which is trying to attract millions of Soviet immigrants, is well aware that the existing water resources under its control are inadequate for such tremendous numbers. Therefore, it is the party most interested in derailing any current peace arrangements until it can impose a new fait accompli that increases its water resources--naturally, at the expense of the water resources of the Arab countries. This problem could be a central issue in any coming peace talks. Jordan, in particular, faces a water shortage as shown by measures to ration water use during the summer.
As for relations between Turkey, which controls the sources of the Euphrates and Tigris, and Syria and Iraq, the few meetings that have been held between the three parties to try to agree on a permanent formula for water flow from Turkey have made no progress. Although Turkey denies that it might use water as a political weapon, unilateral measures to decrease the flow while a lake forms behind the Ataturk Dam Project have shown the dangers facing Syria and Iraq because of their lack of control over water sources. Furthermore, the balance of power does not favor the two countries. A large population increase will cause Syria to face a two-billion-cubic-meter annual water deficit by the year 2000. Turkey, for its part, says that there is a great waste of water in the two countries.
The equation is different in Egypt. Although Egypt is the last party to receive Nile water, it controls this resource because of many factors. These include the balance of power and a long history of exploiting the river, inasmuch as agriculture in Egypt is absolutely dependent on irrigation, and the Nile represents 90 percent of Egypt's water usage.
However, with a population that will reach 75 million at the beginning of the next century, Egypt requires additional water resources. It greatly supported the Jonglei Canal Project in the Sudan to increase its share of water, but disturbances in the Sudanese south halted the project, which still remains in abeyance.
On the other hand, there is a threat from projected dams in Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile. The threat still remains in the realm of possibility, but that does not invalidate the need to reach an agreement among the nations bordering the Nile, countries that may need dams for electrical power. There are still problems of rationalizing use, reducing excess use, and controlling population growth.
In the Gulf region, the problem involves balancing economic benefit and political factors in providing water by building desalination plants, or through the Turkish water pipeline project.
As for Libya, there are conflicting reports about the effect of the man-made river on the ground-water reservoir in Egypt and Sudan, although it is clear that the Egyptian Government is not worried about it. In any case, it is difficult to imagine that any severe crises will erupt between Arab parties over water, unlike what could happen between Arab and non-Arab parties that share a single water resource.
There seems to be no alternative to reaching arrangements to regulate water relations in the region. This calls for a single clear idea among the Arab parties, so that their negotiators will be strong and able to carry out the interests of its people.